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This article considers how the role of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) in international financial 
governance—regarded as the complex of stan-
dards, market access arrangements, and coor-
dination structures that support the global fi-
nancial market—is changing, the drivers of 
this change, and the implications. Specifically, 
it considers how the EU’s new supranational 
administrative structures, which support the 
governance of the EU’s single financial market 
(the European Supervisory Authorities, or 
ESAs), may affect change. The single financial 
market is composed of the national markets of 
the EU’s twenty- eight member states, which 
are subject to common, harmonized regula-
tion under the EU’s “single rule book;” the sin-
gle rule book also supports liberalized cross- 
border access by financial actors in one 
member state of the EU to the markets of other 
member states. The European Supervisory Au-
thorities were constructed during the global 
financial crisis era in order to support the fi-
nancial stability of the single financial market. 
But they also have the potential to reshape how 
the EU engages with the institutions of inter-
national financial governance, notably the ma-
jor international standard setters: the Finan-
cial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), 
and the International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions (IOSCO). The article also 
suggests that the ESAs are likely to reinforce 
the effectiveness of international financial gov-
ernance more generally. By drawing on empir-
ical observation of the new ESAs, and on a 
composite legal and international political 
economy literature, the article seeks to contrib-
ute to understanding of how administrative ac-
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This article considers the role of the European Union in international financial governance after the institu-
tional reforms it undertook in connection with the global financial crisis. It suggests that the new adminis-
trative actors that support the governance of the European Union's single financial market, notably the Eu-
ropean Supervisory Authorities, have the potential to reshape how the European Union engages with 
international financial governance. It finds that the European Union’s effectiveness in influencing interna-
tional financial governance—and the effectiveness of international financial governance more generally—is 
likely to strengthen as a result. 
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tors interact with and influence international 
financial governance.
The eURope an Union and The 
changing naTURe of inTeRnaTional 
financial goveRnance 
The EU has long been a significant actor in in-
ternational financial governance. Prior to the 
global financial crisis the EU was increasingly 
imposing its preferences on international fi-
nancial governance and, in particular, on stan-
dard setting and application of standards (Pos-
ner 2009). The 2002 adoption by the EU of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) issued by the IFRS Foundation as the 
internal financial reporting standard for EU 
listed companies, for example, became associ-
ated with a weakening of the global dominance 
of the United States’ Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP). This change re-
flected in part the imposition by the EU of 
IFRS- equivalence obligations on third- country 
firms seeking access to the EU financial market 
(Moloney 2014a, 165–68). Over the global finan-
cial crisis reform period (broadly, 2008 to 2014) 
the EU, sometimes as a loose coalition of mem-
ber states acting intergovernmentally and 
sometimes as a more cohesive, supranationally 
oriented regional bloc, became a significant 
force in the Basel Committee and in IOSCO as 
new standards were adopted for the global fi-
nancial market (Quaglia 2014a). To take an-
other example, EU- U.S. clashes on the over- the- 
counter (OTC) derivatives market reforms 
adopted to address the financial stability risks 
exposed by the global financial crisis became 
a major preoccupation of international finan-
cial diplomacy over the crisis period (Moloney 
2014a, 615–20). The extent to which the EU has 
been able to impose its distinct, collective pref-
erences on international standard setting over 
the global financial crisis period has been well 
documented (Blom 2014; Quaglia 2014a). While 
EU member state preferences have remained 
of determinative importance during this pe-
riod, the period can also be associated with the 
EU’s increasingly acting as a hegemonic great 
power in finance, imposing its political prefer-
ences on international standard setting (Mügge 
2014). The nature of international financial 
governance and of the forces playing upon it 
is changing, however, and reconsideration of 
the EU’s role is accordingly necessary.
The nature of international financial gover-
nance is shifting. It has previously been pri-
marily preoccupied with the agreement and 
adoption of standards governing the interna-
tional financial system. It is now pivoting to 
address in addition the achievement of the out-
comes sought by standards. It is accordingly 
engaging more closely with standard imple-
mentation and with the management of re-
lated divergences, operational supervisory co-
ordination and convergence, data collection 
and assessment, the coordination of enforce-
ment, and regulatory learning and sharing of 
best practices (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). 
Post- crisis international financial governance 
has similarly been characterized as represent-
ing a form of “mutual adaptation” and “co- 
operative development” (Helleiner and Pagliari 
2011). Accordingly, the operational manage-
ment of divergence and friction in standard 
implementation, the coordination of supervi-
sory approaches, and mutual regulatory and 
supervisory learning—rather than the imposi-
tion of political preferences on international 
standard setting—is coming to characterize 
the dynamics of international financial gover-
nance.
For example, international standard setters 
are increasingly focusing on implementation 
of standards, the achievement and bench-
marking of related required outcomes, and the 
risks associated with escape from and diver-
gences in standard implementation. The FSB 
continues to report to the G- 20 on progress on 
implementation of the crisis- era reforms and 
is undertaking regular and intensive peer re-
views of how crisis- era standards are being im-
plemented (Financial Stability Board 2015a). 
The Basel Committee is carrying out intensive 
Regulatory Compliance Assessment Programs 
(RCAPs) of Basel III Accord implementation. 
Supervisory co- ordination arrangements are 
being constructed, with attention being trained 
in particular on co- ordination through col-
leges of supervisors (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2014a; International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions 2013). 
IOSCO has recently engaged in an intensive re-
view of the range of regulatory tools which can 
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be deployed to support supervisory co- 
ordination in the securities markets (Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions 
2015a) and has also addressed enforcement, 
highlighting the tools that should be available 
to regulators globally (International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions 2015b). The 
 international standard setters are also increas-
ingly focusing their attention on the man-
agement, interrogation, and deployment of the 
massive dataset now emerging for regulatory 
use, in the wake of the crisis- era reforms, which 
mandate more intense reporting from a num-
ber of market segments, notably the OTC de-
rivatives market (Financial Stability Board 
2015b). On a bilateral basis, granular agency 
contacts are intensifying as the technical de-
tails governing third- country market access 
and reflecting the swathes of new rules im-
posed domestically and regionally following 
the global financial crisis are negotiated and 
coordinated.
Coordinated and optimal operational man-
agement of technical difference, supervisory 
cooperation, the interrogation of complex 
data, and the sharing of technical regulatory 
and supervisory experience has accordingly be-
come of central importance to international 
financial governance. And as international fi-
nancial governance becomes more outcomes- 
focused and operational, the administrative 
actors in international financial governance, 
primarily the regulators who sit (often along-
side treasuries and central banks) on the inter-
national standard setters, are, in parallel, ac-
quiring critical importance. How, accordingly, 
is the EU, which has long engaged with inter-
national financial governance by means of im-
posing national member state and collective 
EU preferences on standard setting, equipped 
to engage with a more operational form of gov-
ernance; and what are the implications for in-
ternational financial governance and, specifi-
cally, for the international standard setters? 
Will the new administrative apparatus that 
supports EU financial governance, and specifi-
cally the ESAs, provide a means for effective 
engagement with this changed environment? 
And how should these questions be situated 
within the literature?
inTeRnaTional financial 
goveRnance and The eU:  
scoping The liTeR aTURe
In assessing the role of the European Supervi-
sory Authorities in providing a new adminis-
trative channel through which the EU influ-
ences international financial governance, this 
article seeks to contribute to the composite but 
rich literature on international financial gov-
ernance. An influential strand of legal scholar-
ship has recently examined the nature of inter-
national financial governance with respect to 
its effectiveness and to how it achieves out-
comes, including through institutional design 
and legal mechanisms. Drawing on the net-
work theory of international law (Slaughter 
2004), this strand explains how and why inter-
national financial governance, though primar-
ily based on soft law and on informal networks 
of regulators operating through the interna-
tional standard setters, can exercise coercive 
force (Brummer 2012). In the wake of the global 
financial crisis this scholarship is increasingly 
considering the lack of resilience of the struc-
tures and products of international financial 
governance in the face of global systemic risks 
and intense political intervention (Verdier 
2013).
A related body of legal scholarship, which 
builds on the Global Administrative Law anal-
ysis (Krisch and Kingsbury 2006), probes the 
accountability and legitimacy risks that flow 
from the soft- law- and network- based nature 
of international financial governance (Barr 
2014). This composite legal literature supports 
critique of the ESAs as administrative actors in 
international financial governance given, in 
particular, their limited coercive ability (dis-
cussed further in a later section). But the cog-
nate literature on international political econ-
omy provides additional tools of analysis as it 
examines the power dynamics of how different 
actors engage with and influence international 
financial governance and thus can support ex-
amination of the context in which the ESAs op-
erate.
An important segment of the international 
political economy literature probes how differ-
ent actors and their preferences shape interna-
tional financial governance. It has traditionally 
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characterized international financial gover-
nance as being shaped by the preferences of 
the “great powers” in finance, classically the 
United States but increasingly the EU (Drezner 
2007; Mügge 2014). But it also probes how 
“great power” preferences are formed and, 
with particular relevance for the role of the 
ESAs in international financial governance, the 
role of administrative actors (domestic regula-
tors) in shaping and diffusing great power pref-
erences by supporting the “regulatory capac-
ity” of the state: the state’s ability to achieve 
outcomes through the adoption, monitoring, 
and implementation of rules (Bach and New-
man 2007). In particular, the extent of a state’s 
regulatory capacity can be associated with the 
strength of its ability to influence international 
financial governance (Newman and Posner 
2015) by, for example, imposing third- country 
access requirements or by diffusing, through 
technocratically expert national regulators, 
preferences to the international standard- 
setting level (Büthe and Mattli 2011). In the EU, 
distinct member state preferences (which typ-
ically diverge to some extent with respect to 
international standard setting, reflecting the 
different institutional economic models that 
characterize the EU’s member states; prefer-
ences will tend to converge where the distribu-
tional effects of international standards are 
weak), rather than the preferences of the EU as 
a notional global “great power” in finance, 
have until recently been the dominant influ-
ence on EU engagement with international fi-
nancial governance (Quaglia 2014a).1 But the 
regulatory capacity of the EU, notably with re-
spect to the extent to which the EU can, 
through its internal legislative and administra-
tive apparatus, shape and implement (and 
thereby signal the credibility of) international 
standards and, by means of third- country ac-
cess rules, impose its preferences on other ju-
risdictions, has been identified as an increas-
ingly important factor and as strengthening 
the influence of the EU as a collective actor in 
international financial governance (Posner 
2010; Bach and Newman 2014). Similarly, the 
EU’s regulatory capacity can dictate the extent 
to which it can delegate to a representative EU 
actor, typically the European Commission (the 
EU’s supranational executive body), and so 
through delegation pull the member state 
principals toward a stronger collective position 
in the international standard setters (Quaglia 
2014a; Mügge 2011).
The nature of the EU’s engagement with in-
ternational financial governance is increas-
ingly receiving attention in EU legal scholar-
ship, particularly in the wake of the global 
financial crisis and the related framing of the 
EU reform agenda within the G- 20 reform 
agenda, and given the lessons which the EU’s 
experience in designing legal solutions to 
cross- border co- ordination problems may hold 
for the international financial system (Ferran 
2014; Amtenbrick 2013). But the ESAs, as new 
EU administrative actors in international fi-
nancial governance, have not been examined 
closely by either the legal or international po-
litical economy literature. Legal analysis thus 
far has primarily focused on the new ESAs’ 
place within the EU’s constitutional order and 
on their impact on institutional governance for 
the EU financial system (Moloney 2014b, 854–
1009; Busuioc 2013; Schammo 2011). Interna-
tional political economy analysis has focused 
primarily on the member states and on the EU 
institutions, which are established under the 
EU Treaties (primarily the European Commis-
sion) and through which the member states 
operate at international level (Quaglia 2014a; 
Mügge 2014). But legal analysis of the ESAs’ 
powers and their related incentives with re-
spect to international engagement, together 
with the regulatory capacity insights of inter-
national political economy, have potential 
powerful explanatory force with respect to how 
the EU’s engagement with international finan-
cial governance may change. Accordingly, this 
analysis draws on the composite literature out-
1. The EU financial market is second only to the U.S. market in size. Recent analysis by the European Commission 
notes that as of the end of 2013, EU stock market capitalization stood at €8.4 trillion, 64.5 percent of GDP, and 
the value of outstanding debt securities was €22.3 trillion, 171.3 percent of GDP. See European Commission 
2015a, 10–11. 
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lined to examine how the ESAs may reshape, 
through administrative means, how the EU en-
gages with and influences international finan-
cial governance. 
The membeR sTaTes and TheiR 
pRefeRences in inTeRnaTional 
financial goveRnance
The arrival of the ESAs has led to the construc-
tion of a new administrative channel for en-
gagement with international financial gover-
nance in the EU. The member states and their 
preferences have long been the dominant in-
fluence on the EU’s international financial di-
plomacy at the international standard setters. 
International financial relations, notwith-
standing the recent changes to institutional 
governance in the EU and the establishment 
of the ESAs, remain primarily within the con-
trol of the member states and, to a lesser 
 extent, the European Commission (EC, the 
major EU institution to which collective EU 
representation is delegated) and, depending 
on the regulatory issue in question, the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB). Although a highly 
detailed, harmonized single rule book applies 
to the EU financial system in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, coordination in the in-
ternational standard setters can still be loose; 
the member states and their distinct interests 
often drive international engagement, and the 
extent to which the collective EU interest is 
formally represented and has voting power 
varies. As discussed in subsequent sections, 
the ESAs are likely to reshape this allocation 
of competence and in so doing to strengthen 
EU engagement with the current and more op-
erational phase of international financial gov-
ernance.
The EC typically represents the suprana-
tional, collective EU interest (where one can be 
identified, given that the distributional effects 
of financial regulation are felt differently 
across the different economies and market 
structures of the member states). In the Finan-
cial Stability Board, for example, the EC, along 
with the ECB, is a member of the thirty- four- 
member decisionmaking plenary session 
along with the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Spain, which are represented 
by their finance ministries, central banks, or 
other regulator. In the Basel Committee, the 
ECB as monetary authority and the ECB as 
bank supervisor sit along with central banks 
and national bank regulators from Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K. as full 
voting members; the EC is represented but has 
only nonvoting observer status (Quaglia 2014a, 
2015). Similarly, on IOSCO the EC has associate 
member (nonvoting) status while the national 
securities regulators of the member states are 
ordinary voting members of IOSCO. Six EU reg-
ulators are permanent members of the thirty- 
three- member IOSCO decisionmaking body 
(Conac 2015). Member states are, accordingly, 
usually independently represented and coordi-
nation can be limited. Levels of coordination 
have varied over time: a high degree of EU co-
ordination can be observed with respect to dis-
cussions with the IFRS Foundation, but low 
levels with respect to IOSCO discussions, re-
flecting the different interests and incentives 
engaged in each case (Quaglia 2014b). Similarly 
the degree of coordination of national and EU 
positions on the Basel Committee has been 
mixed, reflecting in particular persistent diver-
gences across member states’ banking markets 
(Quaglia 2015).
A more decentralized model applies with re-
spect to other forms of international engage-
ment beyond participation in the international 
standard setters, including the negotiation and 
adoption of supervisory coordination and ex-
change arrangements by member states (Mo-
loney 2014a). Since the establishment in 2011 
of the ESAs, however, the institutional dynam-
ics, incentives, and preferences in play have 
been changing. The crisis- era reconstruction 
of institutional governance for the EU financial 
system was designed to address internal EU 
challenges with respect to pan- EU risk trans-
mission and the mutualization of supervisory 
risks and costs. But there have been spill- over 
effects, notably with respect to the potential 
role of the ESAs in international financial gov-
ernance, with respect to the regulatory capac-
ity of the EU, and thus with respect to the dif-
ferent incentives and preferences that shape 
EU engagement internationally.
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The eURope an sUpeRvisoRy 
aUThoRiTies: a new adminisTR aTive 
goveRnance sTRUcTURe foR The eU
The ESAs represent a new form of administra-
tive governance for the EU single financial 
market (Moloney 2010, 2013). Prior to their con-
struction, the supervision of the single finan-
cial market was for the most part located at 
national level (although coordination arrange-
ments linking “home” and “host” member 
state regulators applied), and the EU’s capacity 
to adopt technical administrative rules was 
limited (Ferran 2012). A significant degree of 
institutional centralization followed the global 
financial crisis, which led to a rearrangement 
of EU- level regulatory and supervisory gover-
nance in order to address the catastrophic 
leakage of risk cross- border in the EU and to 
support financial stability (Moloney 2014b; Fer-
ran 2012). The ESAs form part of the new Eu-
ropean System of Financial Supervision, which 
was established in 2011 to strengthen the EU’s 
regulatory and supervisory governance and, 
hence, the EU’s ability to contain and manage 
systemic risk and to support the financial sta-
bility of single market. The European System 
of Financial Supervision is, very broadly, a de-
centralized institutional arrangement for co-
ordinating supervision and for supporting 
technical rulemaking for the EU financial sys-
tem (legislative rulemaking is the prerogative 
of the EU’s Treaty institutions: the EC, which 
proposes rules; the Council, which represents 
the Member States and is a co- legislator; and 
the European Parliament, which represents 
the citizenry and is a co- legislator). The Euro-
pean System of Financial Supervision is com-
posed of the member states’ national regula-
tors, who provide the foundations of the 
system and are responsible for supervision 
and enforcement; three sectoral ESAs, which 
are conferred with an array of quasi- regulatory 
and supervisory powers (the European Bank-
ing Authority, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority, and the European Insur-
ance and Occupational Pensions Authority); 
and the European Systemic Risk Board, which 
is responsible for monitoring pan- EU systemic 
risks.
The ESAs take the form of independent ad-
ministrative agencies, funded by a combina-
tion of member state and EU funds, and have 
been established under primary EU legislation 
adopted by the Council and the European Par-
liament. Consequently they are not treaty in-
stitutions, unlike the EC and the ECB. Deci-
sionmaking is carried out by their respective 
boards of supervisors, which are composed of 
the relevant national regulators of the twenty- 
eight member states. With respect to regula-
tory governance, the ESAs support administra-
tive rule making by the EC (the constitutional 
location of administrative rulemaking for the 
EU under the EU Treaties) by proposing tech-
nical rules and by providing expert advice. The 
ESAs are also empowered to adopt soft law, pri-
marily in the form of “Guidance” with which 
national regulators must “comply or explain.”
Although supervision remains at national 
level, the ESAs have been given a range of co-
ordination and convergence powers, including 
data collection, peer review, and participation 
(on a nonvoting basis) in the different colleges 
of supervisors required under the EU’s harmo-
nized single rule book for financial services. 
The ESAs can also deploy a very limited suite 
of direct intervention powers—limited be-
cause of the strength of member states’ hostil-
ity to the ESAs’ having powers that could carry 
fiscal risks for national treasuries. The ESAs 
can impose decisions on national regulators 
in three exceptional situations, and subject to 
detailed conditionality in each case: where the 
national regulator is in breach of EU law, in 
emergency conditions, and following a bind-
ing mediation by an authority between na-
tional regulators. The European Securities and 
Market Authority has an additional suite of di-
rect powers—reflecting political priorities and 
conditions as well as the limited fiscal risks 
posed to the member states by these powers 
The European Securities and Markets Author-
ity has exclusive supervisory and enforcement 
authority over credit- rating agencies and the 
trade repositories that hold OTC derivatives 
market data (the authority has displaced the 
national regulators in these areas); specified 
and exceptional powers to intervene to pro-
hibit short selling in a member state or pan-
 EU; and specified and exceptional powers relat-
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ing to prohibiting products and to holding 
positions in commodity derivative markets in 
a member state or pan- EU.
Alongside the coordination- oriented EU 
structures of the single- market- based Euro-
pean System of Financial Supervision are the 
distinct EU structures that support Banking 
Union. Banking Union applies to member 
states that are in the euro area—the Economic 
and Monetary Union—on a mandatory basis 
and to other EU member states on a voluntary 
basis. Banking Union is also institution- 
specific: with some very minor exceptions re-
lating to group structures it governs only 
deposit- taking institutions within these mem-
ber states. Banking Union, a primarily euro- 
area construct, is distinct from the wider 
single- market- oriented European System of Fi-
nancial Supervision. Banking Union is opera-
tional, executive, and risk- mutualizing in char-
acter; it is not a coordination device, as is the 
European System of Financial Supervision. 
Banking Union is designed to address the 
“toxic feedback loop” which developed over the 
financial crisis in the EU (relating to the nexus 
between fragility in the euro- area banking sys-
tem and the wider sustainability of euro- area 
member states’ fiscal positions and, ultimately, 
of the euro) by providing for risk mutualization 
and for pooled support to the euro- area bank-
ing system (Moloney 2014b; Ferran 2015a).
Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism brings the supervision of some six thou-
sand banks, directly and indirectly, under the 
oversight of the ECB. A treaty institution and 
the EU’s monetary authority, now the ECB is a 
banking supervisory authority. The Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism is concerned with bank 
authorization, “steady state” bank supervision, 
and early intervention; it operates under the 
EU’s harmonized single banking rule book for 
the single market. The ECB is responsible for 
the functioning of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism; has direct supervisory authority 
over 129 of Banking Union’s largest and most 
systemically significant banks; and has over-
sight authority (which it exercises by means of 
rules, guidance, and supervisory protocols, as 
well as by means of its deterrent power to take 
over supervision) over the remainder of Bank-
ing Union’s banks, which are supervised di-
rectly by their national banking regulators 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The 
Single Resolution Mechanism brings the reso-
lution of Banking Union banks within the con-
trol of a new agency called the Single Resolu-
tion Board and includes a Single Resolution 
Fund to support resolution. The Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism operates within the EU’s har-
monized single bank resolution rule book. 
Both the ECB (within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism) and the Single Resolution Board 
(within the Single Resolution Mechanism) are 
subject to the ESAs’ powers.
The eURope an sUpeRvisoRy 
aUThoRiTies: a new adminisTR aTive 
channel foR engagemenT 
wiTh inTeRnaTional financial 
goveRnance
Although their primary function is to support 
the stability and efficiency of the EU single 
financial market, under their founding EU 
regulations the ESAs have been given the 
power to develop contacts and enter into ad-
ministrative arrangement with international 
bodies.2 But the ESAs must use their powers 
without prejudice to the respective compe-
tences of the member states and the EU insti-
tutions, so formally the ESAs’ representation 
functions are limited. The more detailed ad-
ministrative powers with respect to interna-
tional financial governance conferred on the 
ESAs in specific EU measures governing par-
ticular aspects of the EU financial system 
 relate, for the most part, to supervisory coop-
eration and coordination, including the fa-
cilitation of information exchange and coop-
eration agreements between member state 
regulators and third- country regulators.3 
 Specific EU measures have also conferred on 
the ESAs a range of powers relating to the 
2. For example, Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) OJ (2010) L331/12, Article 33.
3. Such as, for example, the major EU market regulation measures: Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
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equivalence- based, third- country market- 
access requirements that apply to third- 
country actors seeking to access the EU finan-
cial market. The ESAs are usually empowered 
to advise the EC on whether a third- country 
legal regime is equivalent to the EU regime. 
This limited suite of formal powers does not 
reflect the extent to which the ESAs can extend 
their regulatory capacity and that of the EU 
with respect to international financial gover-
nance and thereby construct a new administra-
tive channel for international financial gover-
nance. A case study of the European Banking 
Authority, based on empirical observation of 
its recent activities, is noted in a later section.
Although the three ESAs have distinct in-
centives and preferences when it comes to in-
ternational engagement, reflecting their differ-
ent operating environments, they have others 
in common. In particular, the ESAs are new 
administrative actors in EU financial gover-
nance, are of ambiguous status, operate in 
complex institutional environments, and are 
developing under the “shadow of hierarchy” 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). Although con-
stituted as independent regulatory agencies, 
the ESAs have little in common with domestic 
regulators worldwide. They operate under 
tightly confined mandates and with limited op-
erating powers. This constrained operating en-
vironment reflects, politically, the member 
states’ wariness in ceding powers which may 
lead to incursions into national sovereignty 
and to fiscal risks, as well as the significant EU 
Treaty limitations which apply to the construc-
tion of EU agencies. The treaty competence 
that has been used as the basis for the con-
struction of the ESAs (Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU, Article 114) remains contested, 
for example, because of doubts that the com-
petence, which is directed to the approxima-
tion of rules for the support for the single mar-
ket, can be stretched to include institution 
building. Although the Court of Justice of the 
EU provided some assurance as to the resil-
ience of the relevant competence in 2014, albeit 
only with respect to specific authority powers 
and not with respect to their foundation and 
their powers more generally,4 doubts remain 
given the narrow focus of the Court’s ruling. 
EU constitutional arrangements also prevent 
the ESAs from being conferred with wide- 
ranging discretionary powers, in order to pro-
tect the institutional balance set up under the 
treaties between the member states, the EC, 
the Council, and the European Parliament; 
strict conditionality accordingly applies to 
their operation, including with respect to their 
limited supervisory powers.5 Similarly, under 
the EU Treaties the EC is the location of admin-
istrative rule making. The ESAs may only pro-
pose and advise on administrative rules, and 
their proposals and advice can be vetoed by the 
EC, even where extensive market consultation 
and impact assessment has been undertaken 
by the ESAs. Finally, the EC represents the EU 
in trade- and single- market- related matters 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Article 220). The shadow of EC hierar-
chy accordingly blankets the ESAs. The Euro-
pean Parliament also casts a long shadow. It 
has long been careful to protect its (limited) 
prerogatives with respect to administrative 
rulemaking, in relation to which it, along with 
the Council, can veto EC rules. It has recently 
shown some concern to exercise tighter con-
trol over the ESAs, including by calling for the 
European Parliament to have access to internal 
ESA deliberations on the drafts of the propos-
als for and advice on administrative rules that 
the ESAs must deliver to the EC (European Par-
liament Economic and Monetary Affairs Com-
mittee 2015). The operating environment is 
particularly complex for the European Banking 
Authority, as it operates under the lengthy and 
expanding shadow of the ECB within Banking 
Directive 2011/61/EU (2014) OJ L173/349 (MiFID II); and Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 (2014) 
OJ L173/84 (MiFIR). These measures confer power on the European Securities and Markets Authority with re-
spect to international cooperation and coordination in relation to the matters within their scope.
4. UK v. Council and Parliament, Case C- 270/12, January 22, 2014.
5. Meroni v. High Authority, Case 9/56 (1957–1958) ECR 133.
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Union and is facing something of an existential 
threat (Ferran 2015b).
With this complex and constrained operat-
ing environment, the ESAs—as new adminis-
trative actors seeking to embed their position 
within EU financial governance— have consid-
erable incentives to strengthen and assert their 
institutional position and regulatory capacity, 
and to reinforce their primacy as technocratic 
and independent agencies, while respecting 
the EU Treaties’ limits on their powers. Inter-
national financial governance is likely, accord-
ingly, to have significant appeal for the ESAs. 
The soft law nature of international financial 
governance means that engagement with the 
international standard setters affords the ESAs 
the opportunity to strengthen their capacity 
and institutional position with a degree of free-
dom. As international financial governance 
and the international standard setters pivot to 
a more operational orientation, they provide a 
natural channel through which the ESAs—
whose functions and powers are directed to 
pan- EU coordination and who have a unique 
set of experiences on how cross- border and re-
gional coordination risks can be managed—
can strengthen their capacity and credibility. 
For example, the European Securities and Mar-
kets Authority is becoming increasingly so-
phisticated in how it approaches the peer re-
view of its member regulators (which is 
required of it under its founding regulation), 
having recently upgraded its peer review mech-
anism and adopted a more robust and granu-
lar approach to peer review.6 It is also increas-
ingly focusing on supporting supervisory 
coordination and supervisory convergence 
across its national regulators (European Secu-
rities and Markets Authority 2015). Given its 
practical experience in managing the coordina-
tion risks associated with the supervision of 
securities markets, the European Securities 
and Markets Authority, although a nonvoting 
member of IOSCO, can be expected to acquire 
credibility and capacity and seek influence 
within IOSCO. As an indication of the move-
ment within international financial gover-
nance to operational matters, IOSCO is now 
subject to requests from the FSB to carry out 
peer reviews.7 The opportunities for the Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority to 
strengthen its credibility on IOSCO may there-
fore be significant, given its extensive experi-
ence in this area and given the initial indica-
tions that its influence may become significant, 
if still developing (Conac 2015).
Despite this potential, there are limitations 
on how much the ESAs can, through inter-
national engagement, extend their regulatory 
capacity and thus the influence of the EU on 
international financial governance. The struc-
tures of national economies across the EU 
 continue to diverge significantly (European 
Commission 2015a), as is reflected in the EU’s 
current efforts to build a European Capital 
Markets Union (European Commission 2015b). 
Accordingly, the national regulators, which, 
through the different Boards of Supervisors, 
determine ESA decisionmaking, will often 
have strong incentives to follow a national 
rather than a collective position. On the other 
hand, as international financial governance 
pivots toward operational coordination and 
away from standard setting (where distributive 
effects are likely to be stronger), the opportu-
nities for strong national interests to obstruct 
European Supervisory Authority decisionmak-
ing may recede. But the ESAs must also often 
operate in a muddy international environ-
ment. The EC, and often the ECB, can also rep-
resent the EU interest and they have strong in-
centives to protect their respective positions. 
There are, however, indications that the ESAs 
will intensify their activities in international 
financial governance—given the potential such 
activities hold for influence and capacity build-
6. On peer review of member regulators with respect to the supervision of best execution see, for example, 
European Securities and Markets Authority, “Best Execution Under MiFiD: Peer Review,” 2015, www.esma.eu-
ropa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-494_peer_review_report_on_best_execution_under_mifid_0.pdf; 
accessed June 10, 2016. 
7. See, for example, International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Peer Review of Implementation of 
Incentive Alignment Recommendations for Securitization,” 2014, www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD504.pdf; accessed December, 15, 2015, which followed a request from the FSB.
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ing, with a consequent strengthening of both 
the EU’s ability to influence the international 
standard setters and the resilience of the inter-
national standard- setting process, as is dis-
cussed further below with respect to the Euro-
pean Banking Authority.
The eURope an banking aUThoRiT y: 
a case sTUdy
The European Banking Authority has an ex-
press general mandate to enter into coordina-
tion arrangements and information- exchange 
agreements with third- country regulators and 
international standard setters (2010 European 
Banking Authority Regulation, Article 33). The 
EU’s major harmonized banking regulation 
measure confers additional administrative 
powers on the authority,8 including support-
ing international coordination and advising 
the EC on equivalence- related and EU market- 
access matters. The authority also sits as a 
nonvoting observer on the Basel Committee, 
alongside the EC (nonvoting observer), the 
ECB (voting member), and relevant national 
regulators and central banks within the EU 
(voting members).
The fragility of the authority’s institutional 
operating environment gives it significant in-
centives to engage with international finance 
governance through formal and informal 
means. This fragility is a function of the frag-
mentation between the single market in bank-
ing (the remit of the authority’s coordination 
and quasi- regulatory powers) and the euro- 
area Single Supervisory Mechanism (the remit 
of the ECB). This fragility generates a number 
of threats for the authority (Moloney 2014b; 
Ferran 2015a). Its quasi- rulemaking powers 
over the single market are threatened by the 
risk of Single Supervisory Mechanism caucus-
ing with the relevant regulators on the author-
ity’s board of supervisors (nineteen of the au-
thority’s twenty- eight national regulators are 
members of the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism), which could reduce its effectiveness; 
and also by the emergence of the ECB as a po-
tentially competing standard setter, albeit 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
“zone,” as the ECB is empowered to adopt 
rules, guidance, and other protocols for the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Efforts have been made to address these 
risks, including through governance reforms 
(a double- lock procedure applies to authority 
voting in that decisions must be carried by a 
majority of Single Supervisory Mechanism au-
thority members and also by a majority of 
non–Single Supervisory Mechanism members 
of the authority); and a requirement for the 
ECB to follow the authority’s soft law and other 
measures. But the risks to the authority’s ca-
pacity remain considerable, particularly as 
euro- area membership (and accordingly Single 
Supervisory Mechanism membership) will 
grow from the current nineteen (of twenty- 
eight) EU member states to, over time, twenty- 
six. Similar risks arise with respect to supervi-
sory governance. The ECB, under the EU 
regulation that confers on it supervisory power 
over the Single Supervisory Mechanism, is sub-
ject to the authority’s soft and hard coordinat-
ing powers. But whether or not the authority, 
a nascent agency established under EU pri-
mary legislation and with significant operating 
constraints, can (and has the incentives to) ex-
ert authority over the mighty ECB, which has 
direct executive supervisory powers over the 
129 largest banking groups in the euro area and 
which enjoys the independence of action of a 
treaty institution, remains to be seen.
The authority has accordingly significant 
incentives to seek international financial gov-
ernance, and in particular Basel Committee 
deliberations, as a sphere in which it can boost 
its credibility and regulatory capacity and pro-
tect its institutional position. The capacity of 
8. This regulation is the 2014 Capital Requirements Directive IV, Capital Requirements Regulation, which, inter 
alia, implements the Basel III Accord in the EU: Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, amending Regulation 
(EU) No. 648/2012 (2013) OJ L176/1; and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (2013) OJ 
L176/338.
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the EU more generally in international finan-
cial governance for banking should accord-
ingly be strengthened. Robust engagement 
with international financial governance also 
affords the authority the opportunity to 
strengthen its relationship with the ECB in a 
somewhat less contested forum than the EU 
single market, including on the Basel Commit-
tee, where both institutions are represented.
The authority is certainly well equipped to 
strengthen its capacity and credibility on the 
Basel Committee (albeit as an observer mem-
ber) and to strengthen thereby the EU’s posi-
tion, particularly as international financial gov-
ernance becomes more operational in 
orientation. It has deep technocratic expertise 
following its technical support of the construc-
tion of the administrative rules which amplify 
the 2014 CRD IV/CRR legislative rule book. It 
has valuable expertise in managing opera-
tional coordination, including of colleges of 
supervisors and with respect to supporting su-
pervisory convergence (European Banking Au-
thority 2015a, 2015b); with respect to the latter, 
for example, it has adopted extensive and gran-
ular Supervisory Review and Evaluation Pro-
cess (SREP) Guidelines, which govern the op-
erational business of banking supervision and 
amplify the Basel III Accord in the EU (Euro-
pean Banking Authority 2014). Its equivalence- 
related activities are likely to have a similar 
capacity- building effect, given the extensive 
contacts and international network the author-
ity has developed in producing its reports on 
the equivalence of third- country banking re-
gimes and on the nature of supervisory coop-
eration between national regulators in the EU 
and third- country regulators (European Bank-
ing Authority 2015c, 2015d).
The authority is also acquiring granular 
knowledge of the emerging divergences across 
the member states as to how the 2014 CRD IV/
CRR regime (in effect, the Basel III Accord) is 
being applied (European Banking Authority 
2015e), which should further enhance its cred-
ibility with the Basel Committee as the com-
mittee finesses the regime. Similarly, sitting in 
the center of a web of bank regulatory disclo-
sures as the EU repository for the FINREP (fi-
nancial  reporting) and COREP (common re-
porting)  reporting disclosures required of EU 
banks  under the 2014 CRD IV/CRR regime (and 
accordingly under Basel III “Pillar 3”), and as 
the repository of EU bank stress test disclo-
sures, further enhances the authority’s techno-
cratic capacity as the Basel Committee increas-
ingly turns to standard implementation and 
review.
As against this, the authority may struggle 
to present a coherent collective position given 
the distinct interests which still drive the na-
tional regulators on its board of supervisors, 
reflecting the different structures of national 
banking markets across the EU, which may ob-
struct its ability to present a collective posi-
tion. Conflicts of interest may arise between 
the authority and the EC (also an observer), 
while the authority must also coordinate with 
the ECB, which, as a direct supervisor and cen-
tral bank can exercise voting power (albeit that 
the Basel Committee tends to operate on a con-
sensual basis). On the other hand, divergences 
and conflicts are likely to be most acute with 
respect to standard setting. In more opera-
tional matters the authority can be expected to 
have a clearer space to influence and to impose 
a collective EU preference.
There is still only limited experience with 
the authority as an actor in international finan-
cial governance and against which its incen-
tives and its growing regulatory capacity and 
potential as an actor internationally can be 
tested. But initial indications suggest a poten-
tial for growing influence by the authority (and 
so of the EU), particularly on more operational 
matters in relation to which it sits on a number 
of Basel Committee subgroups and working 
groups (European Banking Authority 2015f; 
Quaglia 2015). Its incentives to achieve a col-
lective position on its board of supervisors and 
to seek to influence Basel Committee delibera-
tions can be expected to increase as the ECB 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism in-
creases its power, and as the authority be-
comes more expert on the implementation of 
the Basel III Accord in the EU, particularly if 
banking governance internationally continues 
its current operationally charged trajectory.
This development is likely to strengthen in-
ternational financial governance in the bank-
ing sphere. The authority has significant po-
tential as a “legalization” mechanism (Bach 
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and Newman 2014), which supports the injec-
tion of soft Basel Committee standards into 
binding EU law through its proposal of admin-
istrative rules to the EC and which thereby sig-
nals the credibility of standards. The authori-
ty’s soft law can be expected to have a similar 
effect. Its soft “SREP Guidelines” on how the 
2014 CRD IV/CRR/Basel III regime is to be su-
pervised in practice (European Banking Au-
thority 2014) have considerable potential to 
support the diffusion of global good practice 
in how the Basel III SREP supervisory process 
should be carried out and monitored—partic-
ularly as the authority is committed to ongoing 
review and monitoring of the guidelines. The 
authority also has the capacity to act as a po-
tential corrective agent, and thereby to support 
the convergent application of Basel Committee 
standards. International standards, as has 
been extensively documented, are vulnerable 
to being reshaped during the national imple-
mentation process in order to provide escape 
opportunities. In the EU the Basel III Accord 
has been subject to numerous exemptions and 
derogations in its implementation through the 
2014 CRD IV/CRR regime. This led to the Basel 
Committee’s finding, in its December 2014 
Regulatory Compliance and Assessment Pro-
gram review of the EU’s Basel III implementa-
tion, that the EU was “materially noncompli-
ant” with the Basel III Accord in a number of 
respects (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision 2014b). The authority, which given its 
precarious institutional position has much to 
gain from claiming ownership over the Basel 
Committee monitoring process, has been ro-
bust in warning of the risks that divergent im-
plementation of the Basel III Accord poses and 
has called for corrective action from the EU’s 
co- legislators in response to specific types of 
divergence. It has also suggested interim reme-
dial action to be taken by its member regula-
tors (European Banking Authority 2015e). The 
corrective function that appears to be emerg-
ing through the authority augurs well, accord-
ingly, for the regulatory capacity of the EU at 
least to highlight divergences in Basel Com-
mittee standard implementation and to place 
pressure, accordingly, on its member states, 
from independent, technocratic regulators op-
erating collectively through the authority, to 
take remedial action through the EU legislative 
process.
The authority’s engagement may also have 
the effect of strengthening the accountability 
and legitimacy of Basel Committee standards, 
at least in the EU. The mechanisms through 
which the accountability and legitimacy of in-
ternational financial governance are supported 
can be weak but are strengthening (Barr 2014). 
The strengthening process may be further en-
hanced by the changes in how the EU engages 
with international financial governance. Like 
all the ESAs, the authority is subject to an ar-
ray of accountability and legitimacy mecha-
nisms under its founding 2010 regulation.9 
These include reporting obligations to the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council, to whom the 
authority is formally accountable; the design 
of its board of supervisors (which includes the 
EC in a nonvoting capacity as well as national 
regulators); and the many constraints that ap-
ply to authority operation under its foundation 
regulation, which imposes strict conditionality 
on its action. Any overreaching with respect to 
international financial governance by the au-
thority will likely be constrained by its board 
of supervisors as well as by the EC, European 
Parliament, and Council, particularly where re-
distributive effects may be significant and na-
tional and EU institutional interests are strong.
In addition, the authority, like all the ESAs, 
is subject to a wide range of consultation obli-
gations under its founding 2010 regulation. 
These include obligations to consult widely; 
engage in impact assessment; provide feed-
back; and have a representative “Stakeholder 
Group” composed of industry, user, consumer, 
and other constituencies. In engaging with the 
Basel Committee the authority is accordingly 
subject to a range of procedural devices and 
operates within a constrained institutional en-
vironment, both of which should enhance the 
accountability and legitimacy of EU engage-
ment with international financial governance. 
The authority is, for example, subject to a more 
restrictive set of accountability and legitimacy 
controls than the EC.
9. See note 2.
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conclUsion
The management of operational risks through 
coordinated action by regulators is increas-
ingly displacing standard setting as the major 
preoccupation of the international standard 
setters. Although the EU has typically engaged 
with international financial governance and 
the international standard setters primarily 
through its member states, and although en-
gagement has primarily been in the form of the 
imposition of national and (less frequently) 
collective EU preferences on standard setting, 
it is well equipped to manage this pivot. This 
article suggests that the EU’s European Super-
visory Authorities have opened up a new ad-
ministrative channel through which the EU 
can engage with international financial gover-
nance and the international standard setters. 
It predicts, from empirical observation of the 
recent activities of the European Banking Au-
thority in particular and analysis of its operat-
ing environment and of the incentives it gen-
erates, that the ESAs may gain influence on the 
international standard setters. The EU’s ability 
to impose its preferences, at least with respect 
to more operational matters, may accordingly 
be strengthened. This development augurs 
well for the effectiveness of international fi-
nancial governance more generally.
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